Monthly Archives: November 2013

End the N.S.A. Dragnet, Now

The New York Times

End the N.S.A. Dragnet, Now

By RON WYDEN, MARK UDALL and MARTIN HEINRICH

WASHINGTON — THE framers of the Constitution declared that government officials had no power to seize the records of individual Americans without evidence of wrongdoing, and they embedded this principle in the Fourth Amendment. The bulk collection of Americans’ telephone records — so-called metadata — by the National Security Agency is, in our view, a clear case of a general warrant that violates the spirit of the framers’ intentions. This intrusive program was authorized under a secret legal process by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, so for years American citizens did not have the knowledge needed to challenge the infringement of their privacy rights.

Our first priority is to keep Americans safe from the threat of terrorism. If government agencies identify a suspected terrorist, they should absolutely go to the relevant phone companies to get that person’s phone records. But this can be done without collecting the records of millions of law-abiding Americans. We recall Benjamin Franklin’s famous admonition that those who would give up essential liberty in the pursuit of temporary safety will lose both and deserve neither.

The usefulness of the bulk collection program has been greatly exaggerated. We have yet to see any proof that it provides real, unique value in protecting national security. In spite of our repeated requests, the N.S.A. has not provided evidence of any instance when the agency used this program to review phone records that could not have been obtained using a regular court order or emergency authorization.

Despite this, the surveillance reform bill recently ratified by the Senate Intelligence Committee would explicitly permit the government to engage in dragnet collection as long as there were rules about when officials could look at these phone records. It would also give intelligence agencies wide latitude to conduct warrantless searches for Americans’ phone calls and emails.

This is not the true reform that poll after poll has shown the American people want. It is preserving business as usual. When the Bill of Rights was adopted, it established that Americans’ papers and effects should be seized only when there was specific evidence of suspicious activity. It did not permit government agencies to issue general warrants as long as records seized were reviewed with the permission of senior officials.

Congress has a crucial opportunity to reassert constitutionally guaranteed liberties by reforming the N.S.A.’s overbroad collection of Americans’ personal data. But the Intelligence Committee bill squanders this chance. It would enable some of the most constitutionally questionable surveillance activities now exposed to the public eye. The Senate should be reining in these programs, not giving them a stamp of approval.

As members of the Intelligence Committee, we strongly disagree with this approach. We had already proposed our own, bipartisan surveillance reform legislation, the Intelligence Oversight and Surveillance Reform Act, which we have sponsored with a number of other senators. Our bill would prohibit the government from conducting warrantless “backdoor searches” of Americans’ communications — including emails, text messages and Internet use — under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It would also create a “constitutional advocate” to present an opposing view when the F.I.S.C. is considering major questions of law or constitutional interpretation.

Rather than adopt our legislation, the Intelligence Committee chose to codify excessively broad domestic surveillance authorities. So we offered amendments: One would end the bulk collection of Americans’ records, but still allow intelligence agencies to obtain information they legitimately needed for national security purposes by getting the approval of a judge, which could even be done after the fact in emergency situations. Another of our amendments sought to prevent the N.S.A. from collecting Americans’ cellphone location information in bulk — a capability that potentially turns the cellphone of every man, woman and child in America into a tracking device.

Each of these proposals represents real and meaningful reform, which we believe would have fulfilled the purpose of protecting our security and liberty. Each was rejected by the committee, in some cases by a single vote.

But we will continue to engage with our colleagues and seek to advance the reforms that the American people want and deserve. As part of this effort, we will push to hold a comprehensive reform debate on the Senate floor.

There is no question that our nation’s intelligence professionals are dedicated, patriotic men and women who make real sacrifices to help keep our country safe and free. We believe that they should be able to do their jobs secure in the knowledge that their agencies have the confidence of the American people

But this trust has been undermined by the N.S.A.’s domestic surveillance programs, as well as by senior officials’ misleading statements about surveillance. Only by ending the dragnet collection of ordinary Americans’ private information can this trust be rebuilt.

Congress needs to preserve the agencies’ ability to collect information that is actually necessary to guard against threats to our security. But it also needs to preserve the right of citizens to be free from unwarranted interference in their lives, which the framers understood was vital to American liberties.

Ron Wyden of Oregon, Mark Udall of Colorado and Martin Heinrich of New Mexico, all Democrats, are United States senators.

The North Carolina Five

The New York Times

The North Carolina Five

By 

The Uniform Athlete Agents Act was a bill drafted 13 years ago at the urging of the N.C.A.A. The drafters were members of something called the Uniform Law Commission, whose job it is to propose model legislation that the states can then adopt if they so choose. Today, 41 states have the law, or some variant of it, on their books.

The law essentially criminalizes most contact between sports agents and college athletes — something that heretofore had merely been a violation of N.C.A.A. rules. Agents who give athletes money are now violating the law. “Runners” who act as go-betweens for agents are violating the law. Agents who don’t announce to the university that they want to talk to an enrolled athlete are violating the law. It is a measure of how good a job the N.C.A.A. has done in brainwashing the country that the simple act of handing money to — or giving advice to — a college student is now against the law in most of the country when the recipient happens to play a sport.

(And you wonder why so many college football and men’s basketball players come out of school so ill-equipped for life? According to Sports Illustrated, some 78 percent of professional football players are either bankrupt or in serious financial trouble within two years of their retirement. Maybe if the N.C.A.A. encouraged players to get agents while they were still in school, instead of criminalizing such contact, athletes would be a little better prepared for what comes afterward. Instead, the N.C.A.A. views this activity as the work of “unscrupulous agents” who are “victimizing” athletes. But I digress.)

Still, on anyone’s list of criminal activities, slipping a few bucks to the middle linebacker has to rank pretty low. Which perhaps explains why, so far as I can tell, no one had ever been indicted before for violating the law.

Until last month, that is. That’s when Jim Woodall, the top prosecutor in Orange County, N.C., egged on by the North Carolina Secretary of State’s Office, which had conducted a lengthy investigation, indicted five people for funneling “illegal” benefits to three former University of North Carolina football players.

At the center of this “conspiracy” is a small-time agent named Terry Watson, who, in 2010, is alleged to have given the three athletes in question a total of around $24,000. What he hoped for was that the players would use him as their agent when they went pro. (They didn’t.) The charge is “athlete agent inducement.”

The other four were indicted on charges of being the supposed go-betweens. It is one of those alleged go-betweens I want to briefly focus on. It used to be that the N.C.A.A. could only wreck the lives of athletes. Now, it appears, thanks to the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, nonathletes can also have their lives wrecked by the N.C.A.A.

Between 2007 and 2009, Jennifer Wiley Thompson was an academic adviser for North Carolina athletes. Her original crime, in the eyes of the N.C.A.A., was giving athletes a little too much help. She wasn’t writing papers for them, but she was helping them make them better. When the football team became mired in a scandal in 2010, the help she had given became public knowledge. She, in turn, became a focal point in the news media. She not only lost her position as an academic adviser, but she lost her day job teaching grade school kids.

She has since lost a second job — and now faces the prospect of jail time for allegedly passing money to a player for plane tickets. “They are doing this because she helped people with their homework?” said Joseph Cheshire, her lawyer. “It is ridiculous. We don’t see where she broke the law. We’re going to war on this.”

It is a war well worth waging. There is virtually no precedent to look to, so this case is likely to determine whether this law has any teeth. If the Orange County district attorney succeeds in his effort to prosecute the North Carolina five, it will mean that other prosecutors, in other jurisdictions, will follow suit. Going after someone who has tainted dear old State U. will be irresistible.

If, on the other hand, the cases go to trial and they are found not guilty, the law will be rendered meaningless, even if it remains on the books.

Meanwhile, in late October, a committee of the Uniform Law Commission met in Chicago to discuss revisions to — what else? — the Uniform Athlete Agents Act. According to Richard T. Cassidy, who writes the blog “On Lawyering,” the plan is to “expand the scope of the law and improve its effectiveness.” One proposal is to have the law cover high school and even elementary school athletes.

Thus does the long arm of the N.C.A.A. get that much longer.

The FDA and Thee

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

The FDA and Thee

Regulators move to control 23andMe’s new genetic tests.

Nov. 25, 2013 7:01 p.m. ET
The good news is that modern medicine advances at a much faster pace than government, but the bad news is that the regulators eventually catch up. Right on cue, the Food and Drug Administration is now bidding to take over the emerging field of personal genetics.

In a warning letter on Monday, the FDA ordered 23andMe to “immediately discontinue marketing” its genetic tests. Consumers have been mailing in a saliva sample and $99, and the six-year-old Silicon Valley start-up analyzes their genome to reveal information about their predisposition for some 250 diseases, as well as inherited traits and ancestry.

23andMe—named after the number of chromosome pairs in human DNA—does not make diagnoses. The company helps patients and curiosity-seekers to understand their own biology. Patients can also offer their code for research projects—nine of 10 do—to contribute to discoveries about the relationships between genetics and health that could transform traditional medicine. 23andMe has already assembled the world’s largest DNA registry for Parkinson’s disease.

Corbis

The FDA can’t abide such unsupervised innovation. The agency is declaring 23andMe’s service an “adulterated” product under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, in one more case of 20th-century law undermining medical progress in the 21st.

The FDA lacks any specific statutory authority to regulate genomic sequencing technologies. President Obama knows this, because as a Senator in 2006 and 2007 he introduced bills that would regulate the genomics industry. They never passed. Yet in 2010 the FDA simply decreed by fiat that these tests are considered new medical devices that require premarket testing and approval.

23andMe has been working with the FDA on approval for years, and the agency’s letter scolds the company for offering new tests and services before it has received permission for the older versions. Imagine an iPhone app that needed federal approval for every update. But behavior that would be considered visionary in Mountain View is the quickest way to offend the FDA establishment.

The FDA claims that 23andMe merely has to prove that its tests are safe and effective. But what does that even mean given that FDA’s main concern seems to be what patients will do with the information the company provides?

The not-so-benevolent paternalists at the FDA write that “serious concerns are raised if test results are not adequately understood by patients,” and 23andMe’s direct-to-consumer model may inspire people to “self-manage” their care. For example, a false positive for the BRCA1 genetic marker that increases the risk for breast cancer “could lead a patient to undergo prophylactic surgery, chemoprevention, intensive screening, or other morbidity-inducing actions.”

Or maybe it would lead a woman to talk to her physician about the options and, er, double check the results before undergoing a life-altering operation.

23andMe told us in a statement that, “Our relationship with the FDA is extremely important to us and we are committed to fully engaging with them to address their concerns.” That’s what companies hostage to the bureaucracy always say, but it might do better to mount a legal counterstrike.

The agency’s 2010 regulatory move was extralegal, and the Supreme Court and appellate circuits have begun to rein in the FDA for abridging freedom of speech. The judiciary has held in recent years that regulations on off-label drug use, cigarette labeling and other topics violate the First Amendment, and that people have a right to know basic information about their own bodies and to use it to make decisions about their own lives.

23andMe might also want to start scouting locations for a new overseas headquarters, if only to send a message about how Mr. Obama’s regulators are chilling innovation and investment. You can mail a tube of saliva anywhere. The scientists and entrepreneurs helping to lead medicine into the genomic era have little need to operate inside the U.S. if that means begging the government for a hall pass every time they want to do something new and potentially life-saving.

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“These agencies (like the CFPB, FDA, FDIC, NSA, and SEC) have assumed frightening new powers over the everyday lives of American citizens, giving government entities free rein over you and me in ways unprecedented in our country’s history.” Sen. Rand Paul

“As a result of IndyMac Bank’s failure during the 2008 financial crisis, I experienced firsthand the government bullies at the SEC and FDIC. Don’t think it can happen to you, because you are honest, hardworking, and follow the rules? I didn’t think it could happen to me either, but it did. It is not right to ask Americans to fight and die for us on battlefields around the world, to preserve our freedoms and liberties, while at the same time bureaucrats in our own government work to deprive us of those same rights.” Mike Perry, former Chairman and CEO, IndyMac Bank

 Excerpt From Ron Paul’s Foreward to Senator Rand Paul’s book “Government Bullies”:

“The sole purpose of government is to protect our liberties. But today we have a government that has too often become the enemy of liberty. The Constitution is supposed to restrain and limit government’s power. But every day our government behaves as if it has no limits on its powers.

How our government regularly abuses American citizens and ignores their rights would’ve outraged our Founding Fathers. They did not fight a revolution against a tyrannical government in faraway England simply to implement the same kind of government on their own soil. As Benjamin Franklin famously said and our Founders knew well, those who trade liberty for security get neither.

(By the way, in the New York Times article on the N.S.A. below, co-written by fellow Democratic United States Senators and Intelligence Committee members Ron Wyden of Oregon, Mark Udall of Colorado, and Martin Heinrich of New Mexico, they also quoted Mr. Franklin and have similar liberty concerns to the Pauls’: “We recall Benjamin Franklin’s famous admonition that those who would give up essential liberty in the pursuit of temporary safety will lose both and deserve neither.”, “But it also needs to preserve the right of citizens to be free from unwarranted interference in their lives, which the framers understood was vital to American liberties.”)

Freedom is not defined by safety. Freedom is defined by the ability of citizens to live without government interference. Government cannot create a world without risks, nor would we really wish to live in such a fictional place. Only a totalitarian society would even claim absolute safety as a worthy ideal, because it would require total state control over its citizens’ lives. Liberty has meaning only if we still believe in it when terrible things happen and a false government security blanket beckons.”

“Here are Three Articles from (Just) Today That Should Concern Every American Who Values Freedom and Liberty Above All.”, Mike Perry:

“The FDA and Thee”, WSJ, November 26, 2013*

“The North Carolina Five”, NYT, November 26, 2013

“End the N.S.A. Dragnet”, NYT, November 26, 2013

* “The FDA and Thee” appeared online November 25th, but was in print on November 26th
 

“Allow me to highlight—and then question—some of the prevailing wisdom at the basis of current Fed policy”, Kevin Warsh

“Mr. Warsh served as a Fed governor before, during, and after the financial crisis (during Bernanke’s time as Chairman). As a Fed loyalist, while his criticisms below are muted and polite, they are important (given the recency of his governorship) and frankly, similar to many of those made by hard-line skeptics of the central bank.” Mike Perry, former Chairman and CEO, IndyMac Bank

Key Excerpts From WSJ OpEd by Former Federal Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh:

“The Fed is directly influencing the price of long-term Treasurys—the most important asset in the world, the predicate from which virtually all investment decisions are judged.”

“Earlier this year the notion that the Fed might modestly taper its purchases drove significant upheaval across financial markets. This episode should engender humility on all sides. It should also correct the misimpression that QE is anything other than an untested, incomplete experiment.”

“The most pronounced risk of QE is not an outbreak of hyperinflation. Rather, long periods of free money and subsidized credit are associated with significant capital misallocation and malinvestment—which do not augur well for long-term growth or financial stability.”

“Most do not question the Fed’s good intentions, but its policies have winners and losers, which should be acknowledged forthrightly.”

“Fed projections for example, may show below-target inflation and a residual output gap justifying very low interest rates several years from now. But words are not equal to concrete policy action. And the Fed hasn’t received many awards for prescience in recent years.”

Finding Out Where Janet Yellen Stands

Some subjects worth exploring at her confirmation hearing on Thursday.

By
KEVIN WARSH
Nov. 12, 2013 6:42 p.m. ET

The president nominated Janet Yellen, a friend and former colleague, to be the next chairman of the Federal Reserve. I expect she will marshal her strong intellect, meticulous preparation and ample experience to lead the central bank successfully.In the coming weeks and months, financial-market participants will try to gauge whether the change in personnel at the Fed means a change in policy. In particular, they will seek to divine whether Ms. Yellen’s views on quantitative easing will lead to still more asset purchases and a longer period of near-zero interest rates.This line of inquiry is understandable, but the fate of monetary policy and the economy is about much more. The critical issues go to the very remit of the Fed, the efficacy of its tools, its rightful place in government, and its role in the global economy. Allow me to highlight—and then question—some of the prevailing wisdom at the basis of current Fed policy:• Quantitative easing is nothing but the normal conduct of monetary policy at the zero-lower-bound of interest rates. Lowering short-term rates to bolster economic growth is a traditional tool of central banking. But QE is qualitatively different. The purchase of long-term assets from the U.S. Treasury to achieve negative real interest rates is extraordinary, an unprecedented change in practice since the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951.

Getty Images/Imagezoo

The Fed is directly influencing the price of long-term Treasurys—the most important asset in the world, the predicate from which virtually all investment decisions are judged. Earlier this year the notion that the Fed might modestly taper its purchases drove significant upheaval across financial markets. This episode should engender humility on all sides. It should also correct the misimpression that QE is anything other than an untested, incomplete experiment.

• The absence of higher inflation is sufficient license for the Fed to continue its present course. Low measured inflation and anchored inflationary expectations should only begin the discussion about the wisdom of Fed policy, not least because of the long and variable lags between monetary interventions and their effects on the economy. The most pronounced risk of QE is not an outbreak of hyperinflation. Rather, long periods of free money and subsidized credit are associated with significant capital misallocation and malinvestment—which do not augur well for long-term growth or financial stability.

• The Fed’s exit from extraordinary monetary accommodation is about having the tools to drain excess liquidity. Market participants do not doubt the Fed’s capabilities as an expert financial plumber. But the foremost attributes needed by the Fed to end its extraordinary interventions and, ultimately, to raise interest rates, are courage and conviction. The Fed has been roundly criticized for providing candy to spur markets higher. Consider the challenge when a steady diet of spinach is on offer.

• The conduct of monetary policy should take the rest of Washington’s macroeconomic policies as given. In normal times, central bankers do just that. But these are not normal times.

The administration and Congress are unwilling or unable to agree on tax and spending priorities, or long-term structural reforms. They avoid making tough choices, confident the Fed’s asset purchases will ride to the rescue. In short, the central bank has become the default provider of aggregate demand. But the more the Fed acts, the more it allows elected representatives to stay on the sidelines. The Fed’s weak tea crowds out stronger policy measures that can only be taken by elected officials. Nobel laureate economist Tom Sargent has it right: “Monetary policy cannot be coherent unless fiscal policy is.”

• Highly accommodative monetary policy through QE provides broad support to the economy. Most do not question the Fed’s good intentions, but its policies have winners and losers, which should be acknowledged forthrightly.

The Fed buys mortgage-backed securities, thereby providing a direct boost to balance sheet wealth of existing homeowners to the detriment of renters and prospective future homeowners. The Fed buys long-term Treasurys to suppress yields and push investors into riskier assets, thereby boosting U.S. stocks.

The immediate beneficiaries: well-to-do households and established firms with larger balance sheets, larger risk appetites, and access to low-cost credit. The benefits to workers and retirees with significant fixed obligations are far more attenuated. The plodding improvement in the labor markets offers little solace.

• The Fed makes domestic decisions for the domestic economy. Yes, but the U.S. is the linchpin of an integrated global economy. Fed-induced liquidity spreads to the rest of the world through trade and banking channels, capital and investment flows, and financial-market arbitrage. Aggressive easing by the Fed can be contagious, inclining other central banks to ease as well to stay competitive. The privilege of having the dollar as the world’s reserve currency demands a broad view of global economic and financial-market developments. Otherwise, this privilege could be squandered.

• “Forward guidance” is a new, independent tool at the vanguard of central bank policy-making. Since QE began, Fed policy makers have tried to explain that asset purchases and interest rates are different. Hence their refrain that tapering is not tightening, and that very low interest rates will continue after QE. Investors do not agree. Once the Fed begins to wind down its asset purchases, these market participants are likely to reassert their views with considerable force.

Recently, the Fed has elevated forward guidance as a means of persuading investors that it will indeed keep interest rates exceptionally low even after QE. Forward guidance is intended to explain how the central bank will react to incoming data. Fed projections for example, may show below-target inflation and a residual output gap justifying very low interest rates several years from now. But words are not equal to concrete policy action. And the Fed hasn’t received many awards for prescience in recent years.

• Transparency of the central bank is an abiding virtue in the conduct of policy. Full disclosure of its balance sheet and operations is essential to the Federal Reserve’s democratic legitimacy. But transparency in communications about future policy is not a virtue unto itself. The highest virtue is getting policy right. Given manifest uncertainties about the state of the economy, oversharing policy deliberations is not useful if markets are led astray, or if public commitments reduce policy makers’ flexibility to call things the way they see them.

The Fed is a powerful institution, but its powers are neither unilateral nor unbounded. The president has nominated a person with a well-deserved reputation for probity and good judgment. The period ahead will demand these qualities in no small measure.

Mr. Warsh, a former Federal Reserve governor, is a lecturer at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business and a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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“Too much money is chasing too few assets, pure and simple. Artificially low rates deliver artificially high asset prices, accentuating financial fragility.” Tad Rivelle, TCW

“The Fed’s monetary policies are once again distorting markets, just like they did pre-financial crisis, and causing ‘bad choices about risk and reward’, mal-investment, and economic inefficiency.” Mike Perry, former Chairman and CEO, IndyMac Bank

Should You Walk Away from a Fed that Prints Money?
TCW, By Tad Rivelle
November 8, 2013

Activist monetary policies presume that the Fed can control, or at least strongly influence, the rates of interest charged in the financial marketplace. But the laws of economics cannot be conned indefinitely. So, to the extent that the current rate structure – maturity and risk premia – differs from one that would otherwise be established by willing borrowers and lenders, it is an artificial construct. Our $16 trillion economy is replete with opportunities for investors to deploy capital. For that capital to be put to its highest best use, the credit markets need informed and properly incentivized borrowers and lenders to deliberate investment opportunities and to negotiate rates and terms. This, of course, is the process by which the market finds its equilibrium or, if you prefer, its “natural” interest rate. Those who are closest to any given credit transaction are ordinarily the best judge of the merits of that transaction. For this reason, the efficiency and growth-enhancing properties of these capital deployments is maximized to the extent that the individual credit decision is disaggregated from any exogenous criteria.

The converse is that when negotiations become biased by a miasma of zero rates and multi-trillion dollar bond purchases run by a DC-based Board of Experts known as the Fed, bad choices about risk and reward are sure to follow. Indeed, the very point of the Fed’s policy regime is to express a judgment that the “natural” rate of interest that the market wishes to establish is “too  high.” This essentially Keynesian perspective views low rates as “stimulative.” Since unemployment is high and inflation low, the no brainer is supposedly to keep financial rates artificially low. The Fed’s thinking assumes that magnifying credit creation leads to more consumption and spending which – presto, changeo – takes us to a new and prosperous economic equilibrium. Hmm.

While a borrowing binge sounds like a simple and fun way to grow an economy, one would think that five years of zero rates would be enough to prove the efficacy of these policies. Empirically, what we have seen is that even as the Fed has doubled and tripled down on QE, actual GDP growth has remained stubbornly sluggish. Moreover, real wage growth has been at a standstill; the only component of income that has shown any meaningful growth is government transfer payments:

Maybe it’s just me, but it is hard to understand the consensus narrative that the economy is getting better when real aggregat wages are stagnant. We’d go a step further: income growth defines a growing economy, just as it would for an individual or a household. In fact, the impression of an improving economy may be something of a phony Potemkin Village: it has been underpinned, not by private sector gains, but rather enabled by Federal government transfers to support consumption. This poses a rather awkward question: if cheap credit isn’t moving the economy forward, then what is it doing?

One of the obvious realities of abundant credit creation is that the newly created obligations have to find “homes.” The result?

An ongoing transformation of business and household balance sheets in the direction of higher leverage. Thus far, financially repressive policies have shown themselves to be far more effective in terms of expanding the liability side of the balance sheet  (by adding debt claims) than in expanding the asset side. This means that our collective stock of capital must support ever more debt claims. This, naturally, lowers the margin for error and adds fragility to the business cycle. The longer this dynamic is accommodated, the more risk for the economy and for the financial markets.

A second reality of financial repression is that the hurdle rate of return on capital projects is lowered. Cheap credit means more projects appear to pencil out, including those whose fundamental merits are questionable. Further, capital held in the form of zero rate bank deposits or money market funds becomes progressively more restless. Negative real returns on cash – the moral equivalent of a wealth tax – drives flows into high yield bonds, emerging market debt, real-estate, stocks, anything that has a reasonable prospect of earning a yield above nothing at all. In short, the Fed’s zero rate policy is “arbitraging” prospective returns on capital out of existence. This, of course, is accomplished by sending asset prices higher:

When high yield bond prices climb even as leverage ratios deteriorate, when home prices appreciate but wages do not, and when stocks are up but profit growth is flat, what we have is a generalized decoupling of asset prices from their fundamentals. Too much money is chasing too few assets, pure and simple. Artificially low rates deliver artificially high asset prices, accentuating financial fragility. Of course, it is always possible that the fundamentals could catch up and therefore “prove” the higher asset prices, but  that would require healthy economic growth. Is this likely?

To our way of thinking, no. Artificially low rates do not assist growth. Bad pricing in the credit markets franchises economic inefficiency. No market clears at “zero” and financial repression is re-arranging incentives. Artificially high home prices benefit  the “house rich” but correspondingly “impoverish” renters who see their rents pushed higher and their required down payment on starter homes enlarged. As such, Fed policies are unnaturally redistributing wealth. Homeowners are incented to “invest” in swimming pools, not in productive capital. The availability of cheap credit also means that adding leverage to an existing asset is more lucrative than starting a new business. Making money the “easy way” by financial arbitrage is encouraged at the expense of entrepreneurship. Nay, low rates are not the cure to the malaise: they are the malaise.

Thus far, financial markets have understood the folly in fighting the Fed. “Risk on” has been the market’s mantra. However, the May/June “taper tantrum” should serve as a warning: the Fed attempted a “controlled burn” and soon found itself in the midst of  a conflagration. This suggests that a lot of dry timber has been building. Possibly, the Fed can continue to “con” the credit markets into still more mal-investments, in the vain pursuit of a recovery that can never come until rates are allowed to normalize and the market can properly and efficiently take back its proper role. Meanwhile, investors live with a witch’s brew of low growth, rising leverage, and artificially elevated asset prices. These conditions cannot be sustained indefinitely, and so they will end. Either the markets or the Fed itself will come to accept that financial repression is a “box canyon” whose only escape is by climbing out through higher rates and wider spreads on risk assets. Staying “risk on” requires the investor to underwrite the exacerbating risks inherent in an economy that is being given bad signals and is accumulating a menagerie of mispriced assets and bad loans. Yes, you should walk away from a Fed that prints money.

“How can 12 men and women sit on a committee and think they can fine-tune the economy without creating imbalances and unintended consequences?” John Mauldin

“In my latest book Code Red, I fully acknowledge the need for a central bank, but my view of its purpose is quite a bit more limited than is envisioned in the current manifestation. How can 12 men and women sit on a committee and think they can fine-tune the economy without creating imbalances and unintended consequences? Central banks should be for emergencies and for regulating banking institutions and making sure the playing field is level. They should not be responsible for the fate of the players on the field.

Current central bank policy has rewarded bankers and holders of assets. In an environment where everyone seems to be increasingly worried about the divide between the 1% and the 99%, our central bank has designed and implemented a policy that is explicitly rewarding the 1% to the detriment of savers and retirees. It is the rich who have assets and the poor who have liabilities. If you are looking for a reason why the spread between the rich and the poor is widening, one driver (and I admit there are others) is central bank policies of the developed world.

The Fed believes that they are saving the world, and that any problems that persist in the world can be eliminated by doing more of what they’ve been doing and doing it for longer. I know this comes as a complete surprise to anyone who’s been paying the least amount of attention over the past few years, but there you have it.” John Mauldin, President, Millenium Wave Securities, November 2013.

“Our current civil legal system, which once was the envy of the world, is slowly destroying America, both economically and culturally.” Mike Perry

“Frivolous civil lawsuits have become a major U.S. industry, yet they reduce overall economic activity and are destroying our American culture of entrepreneurial risk-taking and personal responsibility (my loss is someone else’s fault).  A cabal of lawyers, mediators, expert witnesses, and insurers regularly settle matters that never had any merit in the first place, as ‘a cost of doing business’ and to avoid years of litigation and uncertainty. In less-civilized countries, organized crime or corrupt politicians and/or governments extort funds from honest economic activity. In America, it  is not unfair to say that plaintiffs’ lawyers legally ‘extort’ billions every year from honest institutions and individuals in the private sector. Our society today seems to accept the fact that we have become such a litigious nation. Some may even hope that one day they might be the beneficiary of ‘millions’ from suing (e.g. that hot cup of coffee I spilled on my lap was McDonald’s fault, not mine); America’s version of the ‘legal lottery winner’. However, our litigious culture is a fraud. The massive costs of our current U.S. legal system benefit just a few (primarily ‘the legal cabal’ and a handful of rare ‘legal lottery winners’), but adds significant and unnecessary costs to nearly every product and service, and these costs are passed on to all Americans (‘the many’). Also, importantly, our litigious culture saps the risk-taking spirit of entrepreneurs and other Americans of action, which is necessary for a vibrant economy. (Why take the chance, I might get sued?) There are many problems with our legal system that need to be fixed, but a simple first step would be to make it illegal for plaintiffs or their lawyers to make a statement in a lawsuit that is not supported by the facts and allow the prevailing party in any litigation to obtain reimbursement for their litigation costs and damages. Frivolously suing an institution or individual is an act of violence, and a plaintiff who does not prevail should be required to pay damages to the defendant to make them whole for lost time, reputation, opportunities, and finances.” Mike Perry, former Chairman and CEO, IndyMac Bank

“Building new infrastructure would enhance U.S. global competitiveness, improve our environmental footprint and, according to McKinsey studies, generate almost two million jobs. But it is impossible to modernize America’s physical infrastructure until we modernize our legal infrastructure. Regulatory review is supposed to serve a free society, not paralyze it.” Philip K. Howard, Chairman, Common Good

Why It Takes So Long to Build a Bridge in America

There’s plenty of money. The problem is interminable environmental review.

By
PHILIP K. HOWARD
Nov. 22, 2013 7:15 p.m. ET

President Obama went on the stump this summer to promote his “Fix It First” initiative, calling for public appropriations to shore up America’s fraying infrastructure. But funding is not the challenge. The main reason crumbling roads, decrepit bridges, antiquated power lines, leaky water mains and muddy harbors don’t get fixed is interminable regulatory review.

Infrastructure approvals can take upward of a decade or longer, according to the Regional Plan Association. The environmental review statement for dredging the Savannah River took 14 years to complete. Even projects with little or no environmental impact can take years.

Raising the roadway of the Bayonne Bridge at the mouth of the Port of Newark, for example, requires no new foundations or right of way, and would not require approvals at all except that it spans navigable water. Raising the roadway would allow a new generation of efficient large ships into the port. But the project is now approaching its fifth year of legal process, bogged down in environmental litigation.

Mr. Obama also pitched infrastructure improvements in 2009 while he was promoting his $830 billion stimulus. The bill passed but nothing much happened because, as the administration learned, there is almost no such thing as a “shovel-ready project.” So the stimulus money was largely diverted to shoring up state budgets.

Building new infrastructure would enhance U.S. global competitiveness, improve our environmental footprint and, according to McKinsey studies, generate almost two million jobs. But it is impossible to modernize America’s physical infrastructure until we modernize our legal infrastructure. Regulatory review is supposed to serve a free society, not paralyze it.

Other developed countries have found a way. Canada requires full environmental review, with state and local input, but it has recently put a maximum of two years on major projects. Germany allocates decision-making authority to a particular state or federal agency: Getting approval for a large electrical platform in the North Sea, built this year, took 20 months; approval for the City Tunnel in Leipzig, scheduled to open next year, took 18 months. Neither country waits for years for a final decision to emerge out of endless red tape.

In America, by contrast, official responsibility is a kind of free-for-all among multiple federal, state and local agencies, with courts called upon to sort it out after everyone else has dropped of exhaustion. The effect is not just delay, but decisions skewed toward the squeaky wheels instead of the common good. This is not how democracy is supposed to work.

America is missing the key element of regulatory finality: No one is in charge of deciding when there has been enough review. Avoiding endless process requires changing the regulatory structure in two ways:

Environmental review today is done by a “lead agency”—such as the Coast Guard in the case of the Bayonne Bridge—that is usually a proponent of a project, and therefore not to be trusted to draw the line. Because it is under legal scrutiny and pressure to prove it took a “hard look,” the lead agency’s approach has mutated into a process of no pebble left unturned, followed by lawsuits that flyspeck documents that are often thousands of pages long.

What’s needed is an independent agency to decide how much environmental review is sufficient. An alteration project like the Bayonne Bridge should probably have an environmental review of a few dozen pages and not, as in that case, more than 5,000 pages. If there were an independent agency with the power to say when enough is enough, then there would be a deliberate decision, not a multiyear ooze of irrelevant facts. Its decision on the scope of review can still be legally challenged as not complying with the basic principles of environmental law. But the challenge should come after, say, one year of review, not 10.

It is also important to change the Balkanized approvals process for other regulations and licenses. These approvals are now spread among federal, state and local agencies like a parody of bureaucracy, with little coordination and frequent duplication of environmental and other requirements. The Cape Wind project off the coast of Massachusetts, now in its 12th year of scrutiny, required review by 17 different agencies. The Gateway West power line, to carry electricity from Wyoming wind farms to the Pacific Northwest, requires the approval of each county in Idaho that the line will traverse. The approval process, begun in 2007, is expected to be complete by 2015. This is paralysis by federalism.

The solution is to create what other countries call “one-stop approvals.” Giving one agency the authority to cut through the knot of multiple agencies (including those at state and local levels) will dramatically accelerate approvals.

This is how “greener” countries in Europe make decisions. In Germany, local projects are decided by a local agency (even if there’s a national element), and national projects by a national agency (even though there are local concerns). One-stop approval is already in place in the U.S. New interstate gas pipelines are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Special interests—especially groups that like the power of being able to stop anything—will foster fears of officials abusing the public trust. Giving people responsibility does not require trust, however. I don’t trust anyone. But I can live with a system of democratic responsibility and judicial oversight. What our country can’t live with is spinning our wheels in perpetual review. America needs to get moving again.

Mr. Howard, a lawyer, is chairman of the nonpartisan reform group Common Good. His new book, “The Rule of Nobody,” will be published in April by W.W. Norton.

 
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“One can hope that in a future financial crisis and there will surely be one…economists, investors, and regulators will better understand how fat-tail markets work. Doing so will require better models, ones that more accurately reflect predictable aspects of human nature…” Alan Greenspan

“Keep in mind, the Greenspan article below in the November/December 2013 issue of Foreign Affairs is about forecasting failures not about the root-causes of the financial crisis (which were largely the result of well-intended government and Fed policies; policies that Greenspan himself pursued). If you read this article or the excerpts I provide below, I hope you might understand why I feel that it was unfair (and un-American) of the FDIC to sue me for negligence for not being omniscient and predicting the crisis in 2007; something they themselves were unable to do. I was the CEO of a mid-sized bank. We didn’t have better models than the Fed, the IMF, or the largest banks in the U.S.. We didn’t even have an economist on staff and frankly it wouldn’t have made any difference. As Greenspan notes below, no major institution (in the private sector or government) or economist predicted the crisis and econometric models would not have predicted the crisis even if they had included data for the past 50 years (pre-crisis, the most sophisticated models typically included data for 25 years). It should be noted that Greenspan (our formerly infallible Fed Chairman) has now changed his views in two important ways: 1) In the past, even after the crisis, he stated emphatically that markets were largely efficient and asset bubbles were not identifiable. Now, Greenspan is saying that markets aren’t always efficient and with the right models bubbles might be predicted. And 2) In Greenspan’s first paper ‘The Crisis’, he stated that ‘central banks deliberately set capital levels of banks to exclude once or twice in a hundred year crises and therefore, sovereign governments must support the banks during those crises’. In this article, Mr. Greenspan does not mention that fact; implying inaccurately that banks set their own risk-based capital levels. It wasn’t my or anyone else’s job at IndyMac to establish the rules for banks (including capital rules), to monitor the U.S. and global banking and financial system, or to provide macroeconomic forecasts. It was our job to prudently operate a profitable bank for our shareholders within those rules, which we did every day until this unprecedented crisis. We and many others thought the Federal Reserve and other government economists and regulators knew what they were doing, because of their multi-decades of institutional experience. We thought they had our backs. We were wrong.” Mike Perry, former Chairman and CEO, IndyMac Bank

“For example, in 2006, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, speaking on behalf of all U.S. bank regulators, judged that ‘more than 99 percent of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regulatory capital standards.’ What explains the failure of the large array of fail-sale buffers that were supposed to counter developing crises? Investors and economists believed that a sophisticated global systems of financial risk management could contain market breakdowns.” Alan Greenspan, “Never Saw It Coming: Why the Financial Crisis Took Economists by Surprise”

 Excerpts from the November/December 2013 issue of Foreign Affairs, “Never Saw It Coming: Why the Financial Crisis Took Economists by Surprise”, Alan Greenspan (full article below):

“The demise of Bear Stearns was the beginning of a six-month erosion in global financial stability that would culminate with the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, triggering possibly the greatest financial crisis in history. To be sure, the Great Depression of the 1930s involved a far greater collapse in economic activity. But never before had short-term financial markets, the facilitators of everyday commerce, shut down on a global scale.”

“As investors swung from euphoria to fear, deeply liquid markets dried up overnight, leading to a worldwide contraction in economic activity.”

“The financial crisis that ensued represented an existential crisis for economic forecasting. The conventional method of predicting macroeconomic developments….econometric modeling, the roots of which lie in the work of John Maynard Keynes…had failed when it was needed most, much to the chagrin of economists.”

“In the run-up to the crisis, the Federal Reserve Board’s sophisticated forecasting system did not foresee the major risks to the global economy. Nor did the model developed by the International Monetary Fund, which concluded as late as the spring of 2007 that ‘global economic risks (had) declined’ since September 2006 and that ‘the overall U.S. economy is holding up well…(and) the signs elsewhere are very encouraging.’ On September 12, 2008, just three days before the crisis began, J.P. Morgan arguably the United States’ premier financial institution, projected that the U.S. GDP growth rate would accelerate during the first half of 2009. The pre-crisis view of most professional analysts and forecasters was perhaps best summed up in December 2006 by The Economist: ‘Market capitalism, the engine that runs most of the world economy, seems to be doing its job well.’”

“What went wrong? Why was virtually every economists and policymaker of note so blind to the coming calamity? How did so many experts, including me, fail to see it approaching? I have come to see that an important part of the answers to those questions is a very old idea: ‘animal spirits,’ the term Keynes famously coined in 1936 to refer to ‘a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction.’”

“For decades, most economists, including me, had concluded that irrational factors could not fit into any reliable method of forecasting. But after several years of closely studying the manifestations of animal spirits during times of severe crisis, I have come to believe that people, especially during periods of extreme economic stress, act in ways that are more predictable than economists have traditionally understood.”

“Spirits, it turns out, display consistencies that can help economists identifying emerging price bubbles in equities, commodities, and exchange rates…and can even help them anticipate the economic consequences of those assets’ ultimate collapse and recovery.”

“The economics of animal spirits, broadly speaking covers a wide range of human actions and overlaps with much of the relatively new discipline of behavioral economics.”

“No one is immune to the emotions of fear and euphoria, which are among the predominant drivers of speculative markets. But people respond to fear and euphoria in different ways, and those responses create specific, observable patterns of thought and behavior.”

“Perhaps the animal spirit most crucial to forecasting is risk aversion. Risk taking is essential to living, but the question is whether more risk taking is better than less…..It is not, and they do not, from which one can infer the obvious: risk taking is necessary, but it is not something the vast majority of people actively seek.”

“The bounds of risk tolerance can best be measured by financial market yield spreads…that is, the difference between the yields of private-sector bonds and the yields of U.S. Treasuries. Such spreads exhibit surprisingly little change over time.”

“Another powerful animal spirit is time preference, the propensity to value more highly a claim to an asset today than a claim to that same asset at some fixed time in the future. A promise delivered tomorrow is not as valuable as that promise conveyed today. Time preference also affects people’s propensity to save. A strong preference for immediate consumption diminishes a person’s tendency to save, whereas a high preference for saving diminishes the propensity to consume….in the United States since 1897, personal savings as a share of disposable income have almost always stayed within a relatively narrow range of five to ten percent.”

“…another animal spirit is at work in these long-term trends: ‘conspicuous consumption,’ as the economist Thorstein Veblen labeled it more than a century ago, a form of herd behavior captured by the more modern idiom ‘keeping up with the Joneses.’”

“Such herd behavior also drives speculative booms and busts. When a herd commits to a bull market, the market becomes highly vulnerable to what I dub the Jessel Paradox, after the vaudeville comedian George Jessel. In one of his routines, Jessel told the story of a skeptical investor who reluctantly decides to invest in stocks. He starts by buying 100 shares of a rarely traded, fly-by-night company. Surprise, surprise….the price moves from $10 per share to $11 per share. Encouraged that he has become a wise investor, he buys more. Finally, when his own purchase have managed to big the price up to $30 per share, he decides to cash in. He calls his broker to sell out his position. The broker hesitates and then responds, ‘To whom?’”

“Classic market bubbles take shape when herd behavior induces almost every investor to act like the one in Jessel’s joke. Bears become bulls, propelling prices ever higher. In the archetypal case, at the top of the market, everyone is turned into a believer and is fully committed, leaving no unconverted skeptics left to buy from the new seller.”

“That was, in essence, what happened in 2008. By the spring of 2007, yield spreads in debt markets had narrowed dramatically; the spread between ‘junk’ bonds that were rated CCC or lower and ten-year U.S. Treasury notes had fallen to an exceptionally low level. Almost all market participants were aware of the growing risks, but they also knew that a bubble could keep expanding for years. Financial firms thus feared that should they retrench too soon, they would almost surely lose market share, perhaps irretrievably.”

“Financial firms accepted the risk that they would be unable to anticipate the onset of a crisis in time to retrench. However, they thought the risk was limited, believing that even if a crisis developed, the seemingly insatiable demand for exotic financial products, would dissipate only slowly, allowing them to sell almost all of their portfolios without loss. They were mistaken.”

“..when fear-induced market retrenchment set in, that liquidity disappeared overnight, as buyers pulled back. In fact, in many markets, at the height of the crisis of 2008, bids virtually disappeared.”

“Financial firms could have protected themselves against the costs of their increased risk taking if they had remained adequately capitalized…if, in other words, they had prepared for a very rainy day. Regrettably, they had not, and the dangers that their lack of preparedness posed were not fully appreciated, even in the commercial banking sector.”

“For example, in 2006, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, speaking on behalf of all U.S. bank regulators, judged that ‘more than 99 percent of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regulatory capital standards.’ What explains the failure of the large array of fail-sale buffers that were supposed to counter developing crises? Investors and economists believed that a sophisticated global systems of financial risk management could contain market breakdowns.”

“Global banks were authorized, within limits, to apply their own company-specific risk models to judge their capital requirements. Most of those models produced parameters based only on the last quarter century of observations. But even if a sophisticated number-crunching model that covered the last five decades would not have anticipated the crisis that loomed.”

“Mathematical models that calibrate risk are nonetheless surely better guides to risk assessment than the ‘rule of thumb’ judgments of a half century earlier.”

“But in the growing state of euphoria in the years before the 2008 crash, private risk managers, the Federal Reserve, and other regulators failed to ensure that financial institutions were adequately capitalized, in part because we failed to comprehend the underlying magnitude and full extent of the risks that were about to be revealed as the post-Lehman crisis played out. In particular, we failed to fully comprehend the size of the expansion in so-called tail risk.”

“Economists have assumed that if people acted solely to maximize their own self-interest, their actions would produce long-term growth paths consistent with their abilities to increase productivity. But because people lacked omniscience, the actual outcomes of their risk-taking would reflect random deviations from long-term trends. And those deviations, with enough observations, would tend to be distributed in a manner similar to the outcomes of successive coin tosses, following what economists call a normal distribution: a bell curve with ‘tails’ that rapidly taper off as the probability of occurrence diminishes. Those assumptions have been tested in recent decades, as a number of once-in-a-lifetime phenomena have occurred with a frequency too high to credibly attribute to pure chance.”

“Accordingly, many economists began to speculate that the negative tail of financial risks was much ‘fatter’ than had been assumed…in other words, the global financial system was far more vulnerable than most models showed. In fact, as became clear in the wake of the Lehman collapse, the tail was morbidly obese. As a consequence of underestimation of that risk, financial firms failed to anticipate the amount of additional capital that would be required to served as an adequate buffer when the financial system was jolted.”

“The 2008 financial collapse has provided reams of new data on the negative tail risk; the challenge will be to use the new data to develop a more realistic assessment of the range and probabilities of financial outcomes, with an emphasis on those that pose the greatest dangers to the financial system and the economy.”

“One can hope that in a future financial crisis….and there will surely be one….economists, investors, and regulators will better understand how fat-tail markets work. Doing so will require better models, ones that more accurately reflect predictable aspects of human nature, including risk aversion, time preference, and herd behavior.”

“Forecasting will always be somewhat of a coin toss. But if economists better integrate animal spirits into our models, we can improve our forecasting accuracy.”

“Modeling will always be constrained by a lack of relevant historical precedents. But analysts know a good deal more about how financial markets work….and fail….then we did before the 2008 financial crisis.”

“Having been mugged too often by reality, forecasters now express less confidence about our abilities to look beyond the immediate horizon. We will forever need to reach beyond equations to apply economic judgment.”


November/December 2013

ESSAY

Never Saw It Coming

Why the Financial Crisis Took Economists By Surprise

Alan Greenspan
ALAN GREENSPAN served as Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. This essay is adapted from his most recent book, The Map and the Territory: Risk, Human Nature, and the Future of Forecasting (Penguin Press, 2013). Copyright © Alan Greenspan, 2013. Reprinted by arrangement with the Penguin Press.

It was a call I never expected to receive. I had just returned home from playing indoor tennis on the chilly, windy Sunday afternoon of March 16, 2008. A senior official of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors was on the phone to discuss the board’s recent invocation, for the first time in decades, of the obscure but explosive Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. Broadly interpreted, that section empowered the Federal Reserve to lend nearly unlimited cash to virtually anybody: in this case, the Fed planned to loan nearly $29 billion to J.P. Morgan to facilitate the bank’s acquisition of the investment firm Bear Stearns, which was on the edge of bankruptcy, having run through nearly $20 billion of cash in the previous week.

The demise of Bear Stearns was the beginning of a six-month erosion in global financial stability that would culminate with the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, triggering possibly the greatest financial crisis in history. To be sure, the Great Depression of the 1930s involved a far greater collapse in economic activity. But never before had short-term financial markets, the facilitators of everyday commerce, shut down on a global scale. As investors swung from euphoria to fear, deeply liquid markets dried up overnight, leading to a worldwide contraction in economic activity.

The financial crisis that ensued represented an existential crisis for economic forecasting. The conventional method of predicting macroeconomic developments — econometric modeling, the roots of which lie in the work of John Maynard Keynes — had failed when it was needed most, much to the chagrin of economists. In the run-up to the crisis, the Federal Reserve Board’s sophisticated forecasting system did not foresee the major risks to the global economy. Nor did the model developed by the International Monetary Fund, which concluded as late as the spring of 2007 that “global economic risks [had] declined” since September 2006 and that “the overall U.S. economy is holding up well . . . [and] the signs elsewhere are very encouraging.” On September 12, 2008, just three days before the crisis began, J.P. Morgan, arguably the United States’ premier financial institution, projected that the U.S. GDP growth rate would accelerate during the first half of 2009. The pre-crisis view of most professional analysts and forecasters was perhaps best summed up in December 2006 by The Economist: “Market capitalism, the engine that runs most of the world economy, seems to be doing its job well.”

What went wrong? Why was virtually every economist and policymaker of note so blind to the coming calamity? How did so many experts, including me, fail to see it approaching? I have come to see that an important part of the answers to those questions is a very old idea: “animal spirits,” the term Keynes famously coined in 1936 to refer to “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction.” Keynes was talking about an impulse that compels economic activity, but economists now use the term “animal spirits” to also refer to fears that stifle action. Keynes was hardly the first person to note the importance of irrational factors in economic decision-making, and economists surely did not lose sight of their significance in the decades that followed. The trouble is that such behavior is hard to measure and stubbornly resistant to any systematic analysis. For decades, most economists, including me, had concluded that irrational factors could not fit into any reliable method of forecasting.

But after several years of closely studying the manifestations of animal spirits during times of severe crisis, I have come to believe that people, especially during periods of extreme economic stress, act in ways that are more predictable than economists have traditionally understood. More important, such behavior can be measured and should be made an integral part of economic forecasting and economic policymaking. Spirits, it turns out, display consistencies that can help economists identify emerging price bubbles in equities, commodities, and exchange rates — and can even help them anticipate the economic consequences of those assets’ ultimate collapse and recovery.

SPIRITS IN THE MATERIAL WORLD

The economics of animal spirits, broadly speaking, covers a wide range of human actions and overlaps with much of the relatively new discipline of behavioral economics. The study aims to incorporate a more realistic version of behavior than the model of the wholly rational Homo economicus used for so long. Evidence indicates that this more realistic view of the way people behave in their day-by-day activities in the marketplace traces a path of economic growth that is somewhat lower than would be the case if people were truly rational economic actors. If people acted at the level of rationality presumed in standard economics textbooks, the world’s standard of living would be measurably higher.

From the perspective of a forecaster, the issue is not whether behavior is rational but whether it is sufficiently repetitive and systematic to be numerically measured and predicted. The challenge is to better understand what Daniel Kahneman, a leading behavioral economist, refers to as “fast thinking”: the quick-reaction judgments on which people tend to base much, if not all, of their day-to-day decisions about financial markets. No one is immune to the emotions of fear and euphoria, which are among the predominant drivers of speculative markets. But people respond to fear and euphoria in different ways, and those responses create specific, observable patterns of thought and behavior.

Perhaps the animal spirit most crucial to forecasting is risk aversion. The process of choosing which risks to take and which to avoid determines the relative pricing structure of markets, which in turn guides the flow of savings into investment, the critical function of finance. Risk taking is essential to living, but the question is whether more risk taking is better than less. If it were, the demand for lower-quality bonds would exceed the demand for “risk-free” bonds, such as U.S. Treasury securities, and high-quality bonds would yield more than low-quality bonds. It is not, and they do not, from which one can infer the obvious: risk taking is necessary, but it is not something the vast majority of people actively seek.

The bounds of risk tolerance can best be measured by financial market yield spreads — that is, the difference between the yields of private-sector bonds and the yields of U.S. Treasuries. Such spreads exhibit surprisingly little change over time. The yield spreads between prime corporate bonds and U.S. Treasuries in the immediate post‒Civil War years, for example, were similar to those for the years following World War II. This remarkable equivalence suggests long-term stability in the degree of risk aversion in the United States.

Another powerful animal spirit is time preference, the propensity to value more highly a claim to an asset today than a claim to that same asset at some fixed time in the future. A promise delivered tomorrow is not as valuable as that promise conveyed today. Investors experience this phenomenon mostly through its most visible counterparts: interest rates and savings rates. Like risk aversion, time preference has proved remarkably stable: indeed, in Greece in the fifth century BC, interest rates were at levels similar to those of today’s rates. From 1694 to 1972, the Bank of England’s official policy rate ranged from two to ten percent. It surged to 17 percent during the inflationary late 1970s, but it has since returned to single digits.

Time preference also affects people’s propensity to save. A strong preference for immediate consumption diminishes a person’s tendency to save, whereas a high preference for saving diminishes the propensity to consume. Through most of human history, time preference did not have a major determining role in the level of savings, because prior to the late nineteenth century, most people had to consume virtually all they produced simply to stay alive. There was little left over to save even if people were innately inclined to do so. It was only when the innovation and productivity growth of the Industrial Revolution freed people from the grip of chronic starvation that time preference emerged as a significant — and remarkably stable — economic force. Consider that although real household incomes have risen significantly since the late nineteenth century, average savings rates have not risen as a consequence. In fact, during periods of peace in the United States since 1897, personal savings as a share of disposable personal income have almost always stayed within a relatively narrow range of five to ten percent.

THE JESSEL PARADOX

In addition to the stable and predictable effects of time preference, another animal spirit is at work in these long-term trends: “conspicuous consumption,” as the economist Thorstein Veblen labeled it more than a century ago, a form of herd behavior captured by the more modern idiom “keeping up with the Joneses.” Saving and consumption reflect people’s efforts to maximize their happiness. But happiness depends far more on how people’s incomes compare with those of their perceived peers, or even those of their role models, than on how they are doing in absolute terms. In 1995, researchers asked a group of graduate students and staff members at the Harvard School of Public Health whether they would be happier earning $50,000 a year if their peers earned half that amount or $100,000 if their peers earned twice that amount; the majority chose the lower salary. That finding echoed the results of a fascinating 1947 study by the economists Dorothy Brady and Rose Friedman, demonstrating that the share of income an American family spent on consumer goods and services was largely determined not by its income but by how its income compared to the national average. Surveys indicate that a family with an average income in 2011 spent the same proportion of its income as a family with an average income in 1900, even though in inflation-adjusted terms, the 1900 income would represent only a minor fraction of the 2011 figure.

Such herd behavior also drives speculative booms and busts. When a herd commits to a bull market, the market becomes highly vulnerable to what I dub the Jessel Paradox, after the vaudeville comedian George Jessel. In one of his routines, Jessel told the story of a skeptical investor who reluctantly decides to invest in stocks. He starts by buying 100 shares of a rarely traded, fly-by-night company. Surprise, surprise — the price moves from $10 per share to $11 per share. Encouraged that he has become a wise investor, he buys more. Finally, when his own purchases have managed to bid the price up to $30 per share, he decides to cash in. He calls his broker to sell out his position. The broker hesitates and then responds, “To whom?”

Classic market bubbles take shape when herd behavior induces almost every investor to act like the one in Jessel’s joke. Bears become bulls, propelling prices ever higher. In the archetypal case, at the top of the market, everyone has turned into a believer and is fully committed, leaving no unconverted skeptics left to buy from the first new seller.

That was, in essence, what happened in 2008. By the spring of 2007, yield spreads in debt markets had narrowed dramatically; the spread between “junk” bonds that were rated CCC or lower and ten-year U.S. Treasury notes had fallen to an exceptionally low level. Almost all market participants were aware of the growing risks, but they also knew that a bubble could keep expanding for years. Financial firms thus feared that should they retrench too soon, they would almost surely lose market share, perhaps irretrievably. In July 2007, the chair and CEO of Citigroup, Charles Prince, expressed that fear in a now-famous remark: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”

Financial firms accepted the risk that they would be unable to anticipate the onset of a crisis in time to retrench. However, they thought the risk was limited, believing that even if a crisis developed, the seemingly insatiable demand for exotic financial products would dissipate only slowly, allowing them to sell almost all their portfolios without loss. They were mistaken. They failed to recognize that market liquidity is largely a function of the degree of investors’ risk aversion, the most dominant animal spirit that drives financial markets. Leading up to the onset of the crisis, the decreased risk aversion among investors had produced increasingly narrow credit yield spreads and heavy trading volumes, creating the appearance of liquidity and the illusion that firms could sell almost anything. But when fear-induced market retrenchment set in, that liquidity disappeared overnight, as buyers pulled back. In fact, in many markets, at the height of the crisis of 2008, bids virtually disappeared.

FAT TAILS ON THIN ICE

Financial firms could have protected themselves against the costs of their increased risk taking if they had remained adequately capitalized — if, in other words, they had prepared for a very rainy day. Regrettably, they had not, and the dangers that their lack of preparedness posed were not fully appreciated, even in the commercial banking sector. For example, in 2006, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, speaking on behalf of all U.S. bank regulators, judged that “more than 99 percent of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regulatory capital standards.”

What explains the failure of the large array of fail-safe buffers that were supposed to counter developing crises? Investors and economists believed that a sophisticated global system of financial risk management could contain market breakdowns. The risk-management paradigm that had its genesis in the work of such Nobel Prize–winning economists as Harry Markowitz, Robert Merton, and Myron Scholes was so thoroughly embraced by academia, central banks, and regulators that by 2006 it had become the core of the global bank regulatory standards known as Basel II. Global banks were authorized, within limits, to apply their own company-specific risk-based models to judge their capital requirements. Most of those models produced parameters based only on the last quarter century of observations. But even a sophisticated number-crunching model that covered the last five decades would not have anticipated the crisis that loomed.

Mathematical models that calibrate risk are nonetheless surely better guides to risk assessment than the “rule of thumb” judgments of a half century earlier. To this day, it is hard to find fault with the conceptual framework of such models, as far as they go. The elegant options-pricing model developed by Scholes and his late colleague Fischer Black is no less valid or useful today than when it was developed, in 1973. But in the growing state of euphoria in the years before the 2008 crash, private risk managers, the Federal Reserve, and other regulators failed to ensure that financial institutions were adequately capitalized, in part because we all failed to comprehend the underlying magnitude and full extent of the risks that were about to be revealed as the post-Lehman crisis played out. In particular, we failed to fully comprehend the size of the expansion of so-called tail risk.

“Tail risk” refers to the class of investment outcomes that occur with very low probabilities but that are accompanied by very large losses when they do materialize. Economists have assumed that if people acted solely to maximize their own self-interest, their actions would produce long-term growth paths consistent with their abilities to increase productivity. But because people lacked omniscience, the actual outcomes of their risk taking would reflect random deviations from long-term trends. And those deviations, with enough observations, would tend to be distributed in a manner similar to the outcomes of successive coin tosses, following what economists call a normal distribution: a bell curve with “tails” that rapidly taper off as the probability of occurrence diminishes.

Those assumptions have been tested in recent decades, as a number of once-in-a-lifetime phenomena have occurred with a frequency too high to credibly attribute to pure chance. The most vivid example is the wholly unprecedented stock-price crash on October 19, 1987, which propelled the Dow Jones Industrial Average down by more than 20 percent in a single day. No conventional graph of probability distribution would have predicted that crash. Accordingly, many economists began to speculate that the negative tail of financial risk was much “fatter” than had been assumed — in other words, the global financial system was far more vulnerable than most models showed.

In fact, as became clear in the wake of the Lehman collapse, the tail was morbidly obese. As a consequence of an underestimation of that risk, financial firms failed to anticipate the amount of additional capital that would be required to serve as an adequate buffer when the financial system was jolted.

MUGGED BY REALITY

The 2008 financial collapse has provided reams of new data on negative tail risk; the challenge will be to use the new data to develop a more realistic assessment of the range and probabilities of financial outcomes, with an emphasis on those that pose the greatest dangers to the financial system and the economy. One can hope that in a future financial crisis — and there will surely be one — economists, investors, and regulators will better understand how fat-tail markets work. Doing so will require better models, ones that more accurately reflect predictable aspects of human nature, including risk aversion, time preference, and herd behavior.

Forecasting will always be somewhat of a coin toss. But if economists better integrate animal spirits into our models, we can improve our forecasting accuracy. Economic models should, when possible, measure and forecast systematic human behavior and the tendencies of corporate culture. Modeling will always be constrained by a lack of relevant historical precedents. But analysts know a good deal more about how financial markets work — and fail — than we did before the 2008 crisis.

The halcyon days of the 1960s, when there was great optimism that econometric models offered new capabilities to accurately judge the future, are now long gone. Having been mugged too often by reality, forecasters now express less confidence about our abilities to look beyond the immediate horizon. We will forever need to reach beyond our equations to apply economic judgment. Forecasters may never approach the fantasy success of the Oracle of Delphi or Nostradamus, but we can surely improve on the discouraging performance of the past.

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“The banking system in the United States has been highly crisis-prone, suffering no fewer than 14 major crises in the past 180 years…A country gets the banking system it deserves..”, Charles W. Colomiris and Stephen H. Haber

Professors Charles W. Colomiris and Stephen H. Haber are the authors of a forthcoming book “Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit”. They co-wrote an article in the November/December 2013 issue of Foreign Affairs, “Why Banking Systems Succeed….and Fail: The Politics Behind Financial Institutions” (Excerpts and full article below):

“This recent Foreign Affairs article is fabulous. A must read if you really want to understand the true, root-causes of the U.S. financial crisis. To be honest, I didn’t know or understand the political history of our banking system. Professors Colomirs and Haber are masters at connecting the dots to show how the megabanks, urban activist organizations (modern-day populist political activists), and the government politically worked together to further their individual interests and were a major cause of the financial crisis. (We now have U.S. populist politics and the Federal Reserve being major causes of the financial crisis.) Colomirs and Haber’s simple logic rings true to me, based on my experience and dealings with Fannie, Freddie, CRA, and the megabanks. I can tell you that as a mid-size player, IndyMac didn’t lobby anyone for anything. We operated within the system and by the rules that were established by others, with honesty and integrity.” Mike Perry, former Chairman and CEO, IndyMac Bank

“The government mandates on Fannie and Freddie were not vague statements of intent. They were specific targets, and in order to meet them, Fannie and Freddie had little choice but to weaken their underwriting standards by permitting higher leverage, weaker mortgage documentation, and lower borrower credit scores. By the mid-1990s, Fannie and Freddie were agreeing to purchase mortgages with down payments of only three percent, compared with 20 percent that had long been the industry standard.” Colomirs and Haber, “Why Banking Systems Succeed….and Fail: The Politics Behind Financial Institutions”

“Fannie and Freddie, by virtue of their size and their capacity to repurchase and securitize loans made by banks, set the standards for the entire industry. When Fannie and Freddie weakened their underwriting standards in order to accommodate the partnership between the megabanks and urban activist groups, their weakened underwriting standards ended up applying to everyone. Thus, when Fannie and Freddie started taking huge risks, they changed the risk calculus of large numbers of American families, not just the urban poor. Middle-class families could now borrow heavily and buy much bigger houses in much nicer neighborhoods than they could have bought previously. The result was the rapid growth of mortgages with high probabilities of default for all classes of Americans….and the widespread effects of the subprime crisis. By distorting the incentives of bankers, Fannie and Freddie, government agencies, and large swaths of the population through implicit housing subsidies, the New American Game of Bank Bargains led to a crisis of phenomenal proportions. For a while, almost everyone who played was a winner. When the bubble burst, of course, almost everyone….most particularly and tragically the urban poor…became a loser.” Colomirs and Haber, “Why Banking Systems Succeed….and Fail: The Politics Behind Financial Institutions”

“You don’t believe Colomirs and Haber (that Fannie and Freddie led the way in lowering mortgage industry underwriting standards)? Here is a 2010 excerpt from a speech given by FHA’s commissioner, which essentially says the same thing. In fact today, the average LTV of new jumbo homes loans (the only significant, non-nationalized mortgage market today), is in the mid-70’s; the private sector is prudently demanding average down payments/borrower equity of roughly 25%. It’s FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac who have the low to no-down payment mortgages.” Mike Perry, former CEO IndyMac Bank

“When FHA was created in 1934, in the dark days of the depression, only four out of every ten Americans lived in their own home. Down payments were around 30 percent, balloon payments common. Mortgages were scarce because local banks had limited capital. Interest rates on mortgages were 8 percent. Mortgages had to be paid within five to ten years. In short, there were tremendous dis-incentives to home ownership. Historian David Kennedy argues that FHA changed that, especially in combination with other actions. FHA insurance made lenders less nervous….Interest rates went down. Lenders and homeowners knew that an FHA-insured loan was solid. And many lenders modeled themselves after FHA: 30 year loans, fixed payments, fully amortized mortgages. Lenders even dropped down payments to around 10 percent.” February 11, 2010, Commissioner Stevens, Standard and Poor’s Housing Conference

Excerpts from “Why Banking Systems Succeed….and Fail: The Politics Behind Financial Institutions”:

“People routinely blame politics for outcomes they don’t like, often with good reason……Yet conventional wisdom holds that politics is not at fault when it comes to banking crises and that such crises instead result from unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances.”

“In the wake of banking meltdowns, one can rely on central bankers, Treasury officials, and many business journalists and pundits to peddle this view, explaining that well-intentioned and highly skilled people do the best they can to create effective financial institutions, allocate credit efficiently, and manage problem as they arise, but that these Masters of the Universe are not really omnipotent. After all, powerful regulators and financial executives cannot foresee every possible contingency and sometimes find themselves subjected to strings of bad luck. Supposed economic shocks that could not possibly have been anticipated destabilize an otherwise smoothly running system.”

“This conventional view is deeply misleading. In reality, the same kinds of politics that influence other aspects of society also help explains why some countries, such as the United States, suffer repeated banking crises, while others, such as Canada, avoid them altogether.”

“A country does not choose its banking system; it gets the banking system it deserves, one consistent with the institutions that govern its distribution of political power.”

“One obvious way to underline how politics influences the stability of banking systems is to note that some countries have had lots of banking crises whereas others have had few or none….Only 34 of those 117 countries (29 percent) avoided crises entirely between 1970 and 2013. Sixty-two of those countries had one crisis. Nineteen experienced two. One underwent three crises, and another weathered no fewer than four crises. In other words, countries that underwent banking crises outnumbered countries with stable banking systems by a ratio of more than two to one.”

“To remain competitive, modern economies need to establish banking systems capable of providing stable access to credit to talented entrepreneurs and responsible households. Why are such systems so rare?”

“How can it be that a sector of the economy that is highly regulated and closely supervised works so badly in so many countries?”

“The crux of the problem is that all governments face three inherent conflicts of interest when it comes to  the operation of their banking systems. First, governments supervise and regulate banks while looking to them as sources of government finance. Second, governments enforce the credit contracts that discipline debtors on behalf of banks while relying on those debtors for political support. Finally, although governments must spread the pain among creditors in the event of bank failures, they also simultaneously look to the most significant group of those creditors…bank depositors…for political support.”

“The property rights system that structures banking is thus the product of political deals that determine which laws are passed and which groups of people have licenses to contract with whom, for what, and on what terms. These deals are guided by the logic of politics, not the logic of the market.”

“The fact that the property rights system underpinning the banking system is an outcome of political deal-making means that there are no fully private banking systems; rather, all modern banking is best thought of as a partnership shaped by the institutions that govern the distribution of power in the political system.”

“Banks are regulated and supervised according to technical criteria, and banking contracts are enforced according to abstruse laws, but those criteria and laws are not created and enforced by robots programmed to maximize social welfare; they are outcomes of a political process.”

“Call it the Game of Bank Bargains. The players in the game are the actors with a stake in the performance of the banking system: the group in control of the government, bankers, shareholders, debtors, and depositors. The rules governing play are set by the society’s political institutions….Coalitions among the players form as the game is played, and those coalitions determine the rules governing how new banks are created (and hence the competitive structure and size of the banking sector), the flow of credit and its terms, the permissible activities of banks, and the allocation of losses when banks fail. What is at stake in the Game of Bank Bargains is, therefore, the distribution of the benefits that come from maintaining a system of chartered banks.”

“In some countries, the institutions and coalitions combine to produce regulation that improves market outcomes. In other countries, they establish regulations that primarily serve special interests, often with disastrous consequences for the rest of society.”

“Perhaps no pair of countries more clearly demonstrates the way politics determines banking stability than Canada and the United States, two countries that are very similar but that have starkly different experiences when it comes to banking crises. The banking system in the United States has been highly crisis-prone, suffering no fewer than 14 major crises in the past 180 years….In contrast…the Canadian banking system has been extraordinarily stable…so stable, in fact, that there has been little need for government intervention in support of the banks since Canada’s independence, in 1867.”

“The populist support for unit banking (in the U.S.) reflected, in part, the fact that local banks depended on local economies, making unit banks more willing than big banks to provide credit to existing borrowers even during lean times. The economic organization of the U.S. banking during this rural populist era entailed significant costs: a banking system composed of thousands of unit banks was inherently unstable, uncompetitive, and inefficient. The absence of branches meant that banks could neither spread risk across regions nor easily move funds in order to head off bank runs or coordinate collective responses to problems that arose. As a result, the United States became and remained the most banking-crisis-prone economy in the world.”

“Even the banking crises of the Great Depression failed to undermine the coalition that supported this inefficient and unstable system. Indeed, not until the 1990s was the U.S. banking market completely opened up to competition. A steady process of liberalization that had begun in the 1970s culminated in 1994, when Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, allowing banks to open up branches within states and across state lines. The new law sounded the death knell of the populist coalition that had shaped U.S. banking institutions since the 1830s and permitted a wave of mergers and acquisitions that created the megabanks that now have branches in nearly every city and town in the United States.”

“In this new American Game of Bank Bargains, populism continued to play a central role in determining the allocation of credit and profit. However, by the late twentieth century, the center of populist power had shifted from rural to big cities.”

“In 1977, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act to ensure that banks were responsive to the needs of communities they served. The CRA required banks that wanted to merge with or acquire other banks to demonstrate that responsiveness to federal regulators; the requirements were later strengthened by the Clinton administration, increasing the burden on banks to prove they were good corporate citizens. This provided a source of leverage for urban activist organizations…..Such groups could block or delay a merger by claiming that the banks were not in compliance with their responsibilities; they could also smooth the merger-approval process by publicly supporting the banks.”

“Thus, banks seeking to become nationwide enterprises formed unlikely alliances with such organizations. In exchange for the activists support, banks committed to transfer funds to these organizations and to make loans to borrowers identified by them. From 1992 to 2007, the loans that resulted from these arrangements totaled $850 billion. From the point of view of an ambitious banker who was seeking to create a megabank of national scope, making such loans, which represented risks that the banks might not otherwise have taken, was simply part of the cost of doing business.”

“The alliance between megabanks and urban activist organizations became even more ambitious as it drew in a third set of partners: the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, commonly known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. CRA-mandated loans posed higher levels of risk to banks than more traditional mortgage loans. To reduce the potential harm to their bottom lines, banks made clear to their activist partners that there was an upper limit on how much credit they would extend. In response, activist groups successfully lobbied Congress to require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to repurchase the mortgage loans that banks had made to low-income and urban constituencies to meet the obligations of the CRA. After Congress enacted those requirements in 1992…and especially after the Clinton administration progressively increased the proportion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loan repurchases that met the low-income and urban criteria….even more credit could be directed to targeted constituencies at less cost to the banks. The banks were now able to resell some of their CRA –related mortgages to Fannie and Freddie on favorable terms.”

“The government mandates on Fannie and Freddie were not vague statements of intent. They were specific targets, and in order to meet them, Fannie and Freddie had little choice but to weaken their underwriting standards by permitting higher leverage, weaker mortgage documentation, and lower borrower credit scores. By the mid-1990s, Fannie and Freddie were agreeing to purchase mortgages with down payments of only three percent, compared with 20 percent that had long been the industry standard. By 2004, they were purchasing massive quantities of ‘liar loan” mortgages, made to borrowers who were not required to document their incomes or assets at all.”

“Fannie and Freddie, by virtue of their size and their capacity to repurchase and securitize loans made by banks, set the standards for the entire industry. When Fannie and Freddie weakened their underwriting standards in order to accommodate the partnership between the megabanks and urban activist groups, their weakened underwriting standards ended up applying to everyone. Thus, when Fannie and Freddie started taking huge risks, they changed the risk calculus of large numbers of American families, not just the urban poor. Middle-class families could now borrow heavily and buy much bigger houses in much nicer neighborhoods than they could have bought previously. The result was the rapid growth of mortgages with high probabilities of default for all classes of Americans….and the widespread effects of the subprime crisis. By distorting the incentives of bankers, Fannie and Freddie, government agencies, and large swaths of the population through implicit housing subsidies, the New American Game of Bank Bargains led to a crisis of phenomenal proportions. For a while, almost everyone who played was a winner. When the bubble burst, of course, almost everyone….most particularly and tragically the urban poor…became a loser.”

“During the 2008 financial crisis, hundreds of banks failed in the United States, and the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury had to marshal massive quantities of taxpayer dollars in loans, guarantees, and bailouts to prevent the collapse of still more banks, including some of the very largest.”

“Canada’s banks, meanwhile, never came under severe pressure. None had to be bailed out by taxpayers. Americans were envious and puzzled by the good fortune of their northern neighbors; Canadians were unsurprised.”

“The true source of Canadian banks’ stability has been Canada’s political institutions….Throughout the twentieth century, this system fended off populist calls for bailouts when banks failed. In the latter part of the century, Canada’s system was effectively immune to the capture of banking policy by special interests, such as the alliance of urban populists and emerging megabanks that led the United States into the subprime crisis.”

“In Canada, the government did not use the banking system to channel subsidized credit to favored political constituencies, so it had no need to tolerate instability.”

“If deeply rooted political and historical forces largely determine the quality of a countries’ banking systems, it is fair to ask how reformers can hope to improve those systems.”

“Banking is a complicated subject, and dominant political coalitions exploit that complexity to make it difficult for the majority of voters to understand how banking systems can be manipulated.”

“Compounding that problem, it can be hard for ordinary people to identify disinterested third parties, especially in the mass media. If you are a financial wizard, being a reporter tends not to pay as much as being a banker. The result is that many reporters, even at top news outlets, deal with financial reform on a superficial level. Partly as a result, the only ideas for reform that have much hope of gaining widespread popular support are those that can be conveyed in simple terms. Consequently, it is harder for reformers to push for good policies in banking, since good policies almost always reflect the complexity of the system and are hard to reduce to sound bites.”

“Despite its challenges, political entrepreneurship within a democracy can reshuffle the deck in the Game of Bank Bargains by getting participants in the game to revise their views of what best serves their interests. Those who wish to improve banking systems must begin from a clear sense of how political power is allocated and identify gains for those who have the power to change things for the better.”

“Meaningful banking reform in a democracy depends on informed and stubborn unreasonableness.

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Why Banking Systems Succeed — And Fail

The Politics Behind Financial Institutions

People routinely blame politics for outcomes they don’t like, often with good reason: when the dolt in the cubicle down the hall gets a promotion because he plays golf with the boss, when a powerful senator delivers pork-barrel spending to his home state, when a well-connected entrepreneur obtains millions of dollars in government subsidies to build factories that will probably never become competitive enterprises. Yet conventional wisdom holds that politics is not at fault when it comes to banking crises and that such crises instead result from unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances.

In the wake of banking meltdowns, one can rely on central bankers, Treasury officials, and many business journalists and pundits to peddle this view, explaining that well-intentioned and highly skilled people do the best they can to create effective financial institutions, allocate credit efficiently, and manage problems as they arise but that these Masters of the Universe are not really omnipotent. After all, powerful regulators and financial executives cannot foresee every possible contingency and sometimes find themselves subjected to strings of bad luck. Supposed economic shocks that could not possibly have been anticipated destabilize an otherwise smoothly running system. According to this view, banking crises are like Tolstoy’s unhappy families: each is unhappy in its own way.

This conventional view is deeply misleading. In reality, the same kinds of politics that influence other aspects of society also help explain why some countries, such as the United States, suffer repeated banking crises, while others, such as Canada, avoid them altogether. In this context, “politics” refers not to temporary, idiosyncratic alliances among individuals but rather to the way a society’s fundamental governing institutions shape the incentives of officials, bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers to form coalitions with one another in order to shape laws, policies, and regulations in their favor — often at the expense of everyone else. A country does not choose its banking system; it gets the banking system it deserves, one consistent with the institutions that govern its distribution of political power.

THE GAME OF BANK BARGAINS

A country does not choose its banking system; it gets the banking system it deserves.

One obvious way to underline how politics influences the stability of banking systems is to note that some countries have had lots of banking crises whereas others have had few or none. Consider the records of the 117 countries that have populations in excess of 250,000, that are not current or former communist countries, and that have banking systems large enough to report data on private credit from commercial banks for at least 14 of the 21 years from 1990 to 2010. Only 34 of those 117 countries (29 percent) avoided crises entirely between 1970 and 2013. Sixty-two of those countries had one crisis. Nineteen experienced two. One underwent three crises, and another weathered no fewer than four crises. In other words, countries that underwent banking crises outnumbered countries with stable banking systems by a ratio of more than two to one.

To remain competitive, modern economies need to establish banking systems capable of providing stable access to credit to talented entrepreneurs and responsible households. Why are such systems so rare? How can it be that a sector of the economy that is highly regulated and closely supervised works so badly in so many countries? The crux of the problem is that all governments face three inherent conflicts of interest when it comes to the operation of their banking systems. First, governments supervise and regulate banks while looking to them as sources of government finance. Second, governments enforce the credit contracts that discipline debtors on behalf of banks while relying on those debtors for political support. Finally, although governments must spread the pain among creditors in the event of bank failures, they also simultaneously look to the most significant group of those creditors — bank depositors — for political support.

The property rights system that structures banking is thus the product of political deals that determine which laws are passed and which groups of people have licenses to contract with whom, for what, and on what terms. These deals are guided by the logic of politics, not the logic of the market. The fact that the property rights system underpinning banking systems is an outcome of political deal-making means that there are no fully private banking systems; rather, all modern banking is best thought of as a partnership between the government and a group of bankers, and that partnership is shaped by the institutions that govern the distribution of power in the political system. Government regulatory policies toward banks reflect the deals that gave rise to that partnership, as well as the power of the interest groups whose consent is politically crucial to the ability of the factions in control of the government to sustain those deals. Banks are regulated and supervised according to technical criteria, and banking contracts are enforced according to abstruse laws, but those criteria and laws are not created and enforced by robots programmed to maximize social welfare; they are the outcomes of a political process.

Call it the Game of Bank Bargains. The players in the game are the actors with a stake in the performance of the banking system: the group in control of the government, bankers, shareholders, debtors, and depositors. The rules governing play are set by the society’s political institutions: those rules determine which other groups have to be included in the government-banker partnership, or, alternatively, who can be left out because the rules of the political system render them powerless.

Coalitions among the players form as the game is played, and those coalitions determine the rules governing how new banks are created (and hence the competitive structure and size of the banking sector), the flow of credit and its terms, the permissible activities of banks, and the allocation of losses when banks fail. What is at stake in the Game of Bank Bargains is, therefore, the distribution of the benefits that come from maintaining a system of chartered banks.

Contrary to the way debates about banking are generally framed, the focus should be not on whether banks require more or less regulation but rather on the goals that give rise to regulation and the way those goals are shaped by political bargains. In some countries, the institutions and coalitions combine to produce regulation that improves market outcomes. In other countries, they establish regulations that primarily serve special interests, often with disastrous consequences for the rest of society.

One way to understand the intersection of politics and banking is to examine two pairs of relatively similar neighboring countries where political systems and historical forces produced very different banking systems: England and Scotland and Canada and the United States.

(Ib Ohhlson)

LUCK OF THE SCOTTISH

When the Bank of England and the Bank of Scotland were chartered, in 1694 and 1695, respectively, England and Scotland were separate kingdoms with separate parliaments but were ruled by the same sovereign, William III. At that time, William was hunting for a way to finance his war against France. Since Scotland was poor and remote, the king realized that he would gain little by creating a monopoly Scottish bank to help finance his military exploits and instead relied on England to generate war funding. Moreover, the creation of such a bank would have required negotiating with the Scottish parliament, which was not as committed to the idea of financing the king’s imperial ambitions as was its English counterpart. In fact, the charter of the Bank of Scotland prohibited it from lending to the crown without an act of parliament; the Scottish parliament was quite conscious of the problems that could arise if the Bank of Scotland were turned into a vehicle of public finance. Thus, from the king’s point of view, it was easier to adopt a policy of laissez faire with respect to the Scots and simply use the Bank of England (as well as other English companies) to finance the war.

In the past 180 years, the United States has suffered 14 major banking crises. Canada has suffered two.

So began the English banking system’s history as a crony enterprise. Until well into the nineteenth century, the Game of Bank Bargains in England was structured to serve the fiscal interests of the state and the personal interests of a small group of well-connected private citizens. From 1694 to 1825, the Bank of England was the only English bank that was allowed to take the form of a joint-stock corporation, in which the company is owned by shareholders. All other banks had to organize themselves as partnerships limited to six partners, which kept them relatively small. Other banks were also subject to strict usury laws, which discouraged them from expanding their circle of borrowers. But the English government effectively exempted itself from those laws, thereby channeling credit to itself rather than the private sector. This repressive banking system constrained capital accumulation by the private sector during the early years of the Industrial Revolution, as investment was financed out of the pockets of tinkerers and manufacturers rather than through bank lending.

Merchants and manufacturers complained about the scarcity of credit that resulted from constrained bank chartering, which resulted in a reliance on small country banks as the main source of private credit, and so the Bank of England attempted to mollify them by committing to buy the short-term debt obligations issued by other banks and brokers to finance trade. But this only made England’s fragmented system of banks even more unstable than it already was: knowing that the Bank of England would buy their bills regardless of the circumstances, country banks and other small lenders had little incentive to behave responsibly. As a result, English banking was prone to boom-and-bust cycles, and England suffered frequent major banking crises in the eighteenth century and quite a few in the nineteenth century, as well.

In sharp contrast to England, Scotland, by the middle of the eighteenth century, had developed a highly efficient, competitive, and innovative banking system, which promoted rapid growth. Unlike in England, where the crown’s demands on the Bank of England required the state to protect the bank’s monopoly, in Scotland, the government allowed for the free chartering of banks. Also unlike in England, in Scotland, the banks were able to link their urban headquarters with branches that operated in areas that could not otherwise have supported banks. Free from the obligation to finance the state and allowed to compete and invest everywhere, Scottish banks pursued profit-seeking strategies that provided credit to all sectors of the economy.

As a result of Scotland’s free chartering rules, competition among Scottish banks was fierce during the nineteenth century, spurring the banks to innovate, inventing new services such as interest-bearing deposits and lines of credit. Scottish banks enjoyed remarkably narrow spreads (roughly one percentage point) between the rates of interest charged on loans and the rates they paid on deposits. Nevertheless, they earned respectable rates of return for their shareholders, indicating a high level of efficiency.

The Scottish system served the public well, too: by 1802, the value of bank assets per capita in Scotland was 7.5 pounds, compared with just six pounds per capita in England. Scottish banks were also less likely than English banks to fail or impose losses on their debt holders. Between 1809 and 1830, bank failure rates in England were almost five times as high as those in Scotland, a reflection of the Scottish banks’ greater size, competitiveness, and portfolio diversification.

The United Kingdom’s defeat of France in 1815 began a period known as the Pax Britannica. A combination of reduced war-financing needs and expanded suffrage brought pressure for political change that led England to imitate Scotland’s success: it relaxed its bank-entry restrictions and reformed its bailout policies. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom’s unified system was a model of stable, efficient, and competitive branch banking.

(Ib Ohhlson)

POPULIST POWER

Perhaps no pair of countries more clearly demonstrates the way politics determines banking stability than Canada and the United States, two countries that are very similar but that have had starkly different experiences when it comes to banking crises. The banking system in the United States has been highly crisis-prone, suffering no fewer than 14 major crises in the past 180 years. In contrast, Canada — whose southern border with the United States stretches 4,000 miles and whose society and culture closely resemble those of its big brother to the south — experienced only two brief, mild bank-illiquidity crises during that period, both of which occurred in the late 1830s, and neither of which involved significant bank failures. Since then, some Canadian banks have failed, but none of those failures led to a systemic banking crisis. The Canadian banking system has been extraordinarily stable — so stable, in fact, that there has been little need for government intervention in support of the banks since Canada’s independence, in 1867.

The causes of this disparity stretch all the way back to the Colonial era. The original 13 colonies that went on to become the United States were surrounded by hostile neighbors. The colonists faced constant threats from the Spanish in Florida, the French in Quebec and the Ohio Valley, and Native Americans nearly everywhere else. In order to survive, the colonies had to defend themselves with force. There was no obvious source of wealth that could pay for a large standing army to keep enemies at bay. But the colonies did enjoy seemingly endless expanses of farmland suitable for growing tobacco, maize, and wheat, provided that the colonists were able to clear the Native Americans off the land. This combination of hostile neighbors, abundant land, and storable crops that could be grown on modest scales meant that some of the most influential colonists were small, freeholding farmers — who happened to be armed to the teeth.

When the large landowners and merchants who composed the colonies’ economic elite decided to declare independence from Great Britain, they had to secure the loyalty of this class of armed, independent farmers. That was no easy trick: the revolutionary leaders were asking the farmers to go toe-to-toe against the most disciplined and best-equipped army in the world. Motivating them to do so required promises that the farmers would actually enjoy a measure of liberty, freedom, and equality if they won the fight.

In the immediate decades following independence, the merchant elites still managed to maintain the upper hand when it came to economic policy, including bank chartering. But their grip on the banking system soon succumbed to populist challenges, culminating in the failure, in 1832, of the attempt to recharter the federal government’s nationwide Bank of the United States. From that point until the late twentieth century, U.S. banking policies were determined by a durable alliance between small unit banks (banks with no branches) and agrarian populists — farmers who distrusted corporations of nearly every type and the elites who controlled them. The populist support for unit banking reflected, in part, the fact that local banks depended on local economies, making unit banks more willing than big banks to provide credit to existing borrowers even during lean times.

The economic organization of U.S. banking during this rural populist era entailed significant costs: a banking system composed of thousands of unit banks was inherently unstable, noncompetitive, and inefficient. The absence of branches meant that banks could neither spread risk across regions nor easily move funds in order to head off bank runs or coordinate collective responses to problems that arose. As a result, the United States became and remained the most banking-crisis-prone economy in the world. Furthermore, the fact that unit banks operated local monopolies meant that they were able to charge more for loans and pay less for deposits than would have been the case had they had to compete with one another. But the rural populist coalition survived, thanks in part to the decentralization of authority over bank chartering, which allowed the coalition to defeat efforts to allow the federal government to charter its own banks. Even the banking crises of the Great Depression failed to undermine the coalition that supported this inefficient and unstable system.

Indeed, not until the 1990s was the U.S. banking market completely opened up to competition. A steady process of liberalization that had begun in the 1970s culminated in 1994, when Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, allowing banks to open up branches within states and across state lines. The new law sounded the death knell of the populist coalition that had shaped U.S. banking institutions since the 1830s and permitted a wave of mergers and acquisitions that created the megabanks that now have branches in nearly every city and town in the United States.

In this new American Game of Bank Bargains, populism continued to play a central role in determining the allocation of credit and profit. However, by the late twentieth century, the center of populist power had shifted from rural areas to big cities. In 1977, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act to ensure that banks were responsive to the needs of the communities they served. The CRA required banks that wanted to merge with or acquire other banks to demonstrate that responsiveness to federal regulators; the requirements were later strengthened by the Clinton administration, increasing the burden on banks to prove that they were good corporate citizens. This provided a source of leverage for urban activist organizations such as the Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America, the Greenlining Institute, and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, known as ACORN, which defined themselves as advocates for low-income, urban, and minority communities. Such groups could block or delay a merger by claiming that the banks were not in compliance with their responsibilities; they could also smooth the merger-approval process by publicly supporting the banks. Thus, banks seeking to become nationwide enterprises formed unlikely alliances with such organizations. In exchange for the activists’ support, banks committed to transfer funds to these organizations and to make loans to borrowers identified by them. From 1992 to 2007, the loans that resulted from these arrangements totaled $850 billion. From the point of view of an ambitious banker who was seeking to create a megabank of national scope, making such loans, which represented risks that the banks might not otherwise have taken, was simply part of the cost of doing business.

The alliance between megabanks and urban activist organizations became even more ambitious as it drew in a third set of partners: the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, commonly known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. CRA-mandated loans posed higher levels of risk to banks than more traditional mortgage loans. To reduce the potential harm to the their bottom lines, banks made it clear to their activist partners that there was an upper limit on how much credit they would extend. In response, activist groups successfully lobbied Congress to require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to repurchase the mortgage loans that banks had made to low-income and urban constituencies to meet the obligations of the CRA. After Congress enacted those requirements in 1992 — and especially after the Clinton administration progressively increased the proportion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loan repurchases that met the low-income or urban criteria — even more credit could be directed to targeted constituencies at less cost to the banks. The banks were now able to resell some of their CRA-related mortgages to Fannie and Freddie on favorable terms.

The government mandates on Fannie and Freddie were not vague statements of intent. They were specific targets, and in order to meet them, Fannie and Freddie had little choice but to weaken their underwriting standards by permitting higher leverage, weaker mortgage documentation, and lower borrower credit scores. By the mid-1990s, Fannie and Freddie were agreeing to purchase mortgages with down payments of only three percent, compared with the 20 percent that had long been the industry standard. By 2004, they were purchasing massive quantities of “liar loan” mortgages, made to borrowers who were not required to document their incomes or assets at all.

Fannie and Freddie, by virtue of their size and their capacity to repurchase and securitize loans made by banks, set the standards for the entire industry. When Fannie and Freddie weakened their underwriting standards in order to accommodate the partnership between megabanks and urban activist groups, their weakened underwriting standards ended up applying to everyone. Thus, when Fannie and Freddie started taking huge risks, they changed the risk calculus of large numbers of American families, not just the urban poor. Middle-class families could now borrow heavily and buy much bigger houses in much nicer neighborhoods than they could have bought previously. The result was the rapid growth of mortgages with high probabilities of default for all classes of Americans — and the widespread effects of the subprime crisis. By distorting the incentives of bankers, Fannie and Freddie, government agencies, and large swaths of the population through implicit housing subsidies, the new American Game of Bank Bargains led to a crisis of phenomenal proportions. For a while, almost everyone who played was a winner. When the bubble burst, of course, almost everyone — most particularly and tragically the urban poor — became a loser.

THE TRUE NORTH, STRONG AND FREE — AND STABLE

During the 2008 financial crisis, hundreds of banks failed in the United States, and the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury had to marshal massive quantities of taxpayer dollars in loans, guarantees, and bailouts to prevent the collapse of still more banks, including some of the very largest. Canada’s banks, meanwhile, never came under severe pressure. None had to be bailed out by taxpayers. Americans were envious and puzzled by the good fortune of their northern neighbors; Canadians were unsurprised. After all, the extraordinary stability of the Canadian banking system had been one of Canada’s most visible and oft-noted characteristics for nearly two centuries. This achievement is especially remarkable in light of the fact that Canada’s economy has relied heavily on exports and is thus quite vulnerable to changing market conditions overseas that are out of Ottawa’s control. More remarkable still, the stability of Canada’s banks for nearly two centuries has been maintained with little government intervention.

Many observers have attributed the Canadian system’s relative success to its structure, one that is very different from that of the U.S. system. The Canadian banking sector has always been composed of very large banks with nationwide branches. This has not only allowed Canadian banks to diversify their loan portfolios across regions; it has also allowed them to transfer funds in order to shore up banks in regions affected by adverse economic shocks. Nationwide branch banking has also allowed Canada’s banks to achieve economies of scale while competing among themselves for business in local markets. Historically, Canadian banks have had lower interest-rate spreads than U.S. banks, especially in remote areas.

One potential shortcoming of a concentrated system such as Canada’s is that it could undermine competition among banks, resulting in less accessible, more expensive credit for households and businesses. But Canada’s democratic political institutions have limited the extent to which the banks can earn monopoly profits. For more than 150 years, the Canadian parliament has carried out periodic legislative reviews and recharterings of the country’s banks. Until 1992, this occurred every ten years; since 1992, it has occurred every five years. The practice of revising the Bank Act (the primary legislation governing banks in Canada) and rechartering the banks is not solely a stick with which to threaten bankers; it is also a carrot that rewards sound business practices by giving the bankers themselves a voice in the crafting of new legislation. Mindful of parliament’s power, Canadian bankers follow the dictum “Pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered.” The stability of Canada’s banking system, therefore, is not the mechanical result of its branching structure; after all, if branching alone guaranteed stability, U.S. banks would have avoided falling prey to the subprime crisis. The true source of Canadian banks’ stability has been Canada’s political institutions.

One overarching factor shaped Canada’s political economy, including its banking sector: following the American Revolution, British policymakers were determined to hold on to Canada. But the vast majority of Canadian colonists in the late eighteenth century were of French origin and not particularly loyal to the United Kingdom. Keeping control of Canada thus required British policymakers to make concessions to the colonists’ demands for increased self-government while also limiting the political power of the large French population. The British solution was a federal system that diminished French-Canadian influence and gave the central government control over economic policymaking. One result was that even after Canada became functionally independent from the United Kingdom, Canada’s provinces, such as Quebec, never enjoyed the power to create local banks that could serve as the nucleus of a coalition opposed to a national bank, as happened in the United States.

There were populist challenges to Canadian banking laws, but Canada’s political institutions made it difficult to change the basic rules of the country’s Game of Bank Bargains. Banking reforms had to originate in the House of Commons, where it was much harder to create and sustain a winning agrarian populist coalition than would have been the case had bank laws been enacted at the provincial level. Any reform that got through the House of Commons then had to be approved by the appointed Senate, where groups favoring the status quo were usually able to delay changes, propose watered-down compromises, or block proposals entirely. Throughout the twentieth century, this system fended off populist calls for bailouts when banks failed.

In the latter part of the century, Canada’s system was effectively immune to the capture of banking policy by special interests, such as the alliance of urban populists and emerging megabanks that led the United States into the subprime crisis. After World War II, the return of hundreds of thousands of Canadian servicemen led to rapid urbanization and an explosion of demand for housing in Canada’s cities. The government took a number of steps to provide housing credit to this crucial new urban constituency, but it did not do so by pressuring the banks. Rather, the government initially responded to the demand by passing legislation and reforms that, in essence, encouraged insurance companies to underwrite mortgages. And when the market looked unattractive to insurance companies, the federal government directly subsidized homebuilders using taxpayer dollars. This form of support avoided the sort of dangerous subsidization of extremely risky mortgages that took place in the United States. Thus, when Canada’s banks finally entered mortgage markets in the 1980s, they did so with quite conservative underwriting standards.

Many observers of the Canadian banking system attribute its superior performance and stability to its regulatory structure, but effective regulation is best seen as a symptom of deeper political forces. In the United States, regulators permitted instability because it served powerful political interests: rural populists and unit banks prior to the 1980s and urban populists and megabanks afterward. In Canada, the government did not use the banking system to channel subsidized credit to favored political constituencies, so it had no need to tolerate instability.

TOO FLAWED TO FIX?

If deeply rooted political and historical forces largely determine the quality of countries’ banking systems, it is fair to ask how reformers can hope to improve those systems. Within a democracy, effective reforms in banking require more than good ideas or brief windows of opportunity. What is crucial is persistent popular support for good ideas. That is easier imagined than accomplished. Self-interested parties with strong vested interests distract and misinform the public, making it very hard for good ideas to win the day. Banking is a complicated subject, and dominant political coalitions exploit that complexity to make it difficult for the majority of voters to understand how banking systems can be manipulated.

Compounding that problem, it can be hard for ordinary people to identify disinterested third parties, especially in the mass media. If you are a financial wizard, being a reporter tends not to pay as much as being a banker. The result is that many reporters, even at top news outlets, deal with financial reform on a superficial level. Partly as a result, the only ideas for reform that have much hope of gaining widespread popular support are those that can be conveyed in simple terms. Consequently, it is harder for reformers to push for good policies in banking, since good policies almost always reflect the complexity of the system and are hard to reduce to sound bites.

Nevertheless, an unvarnished appreciation for the realities and ironies of the political world and the difficulties of bank regulatory reform should not lead to cynicism or hopelessness. Despite its challenges, political entrepreneurship within a democracy can reshuffle the deck in the Game of Bank Bargains by getting participants in the game to revise their views of what best serves their interests. Those who wish to improve banking systems must begin from a clear sense of how political power is allocated and identify gains for those who have the power to change things for the better. It does no good to assume that all the alternative feasible political bargains have already been considered and rejected. As George Bernard Shaw wrote, “The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man.” Meaningful banking reform in a democracy depends on informed and stubborn unreasonableness.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140162/charles-w-calomiris-and-stephen-h-haber/why-banking-systems-succeed-and-fail